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IMPACT OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
ON THE INDIAN FAMILY

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This paper is divided into four parts. In Part I are highlighted the major characteristics of development and change in India over the past thirty years as can be said to bear on the family. Part II deals with the major variables of change in the family at the aggregate level for India and at a somewhat disaggregated level for the State of Kerala, a State which, as we shall note, has undergone certain remarkable changes in some family formation variables far in advance of the rest of the country. In Part III, we concern ourselves with a selected distinctive features of the demographic scene in Kerala State. In the part that follows, an attempt is made at the level of further disaggregation, to see how development has affected the family among disadvantaged groups. For this purpose, the paper relies principally on the observations made in the course of micro-level studies of low-income households and villages in Kerala. The paper concludes by offering some observations on the likely future of the Indian family under the impact of the various forces, negative as well as positive, set in motion in the process of development. The emphasis here is on the disadvantaged group in the Indian society.

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Major Characteristics of Development in India

Development experience for any country is usually many faceted. All of this experience is not captured by figures relating to growth and composition of a country's national output. Thus growth of output alone may not tell us enough of the change in employment opportunities, nor of the change in income distribution, and nothing of the expansion of social services such as education and public health. That is why in tabulating the indices of development in India, we have not confined ourselves to only the growth of national output. See Table I.

With the acceleration of development in India in the past thirty years, 1950-51 to 1980-81, per capita income increased though only modestly, in spite of a substantial increase in population. Thus, while the Indian G.D.P. has grown between 1950-51 and 1980-81 at the rate of 3.5 per cent per year, per capita income increased by only 50% in a span of thirty years. The rest was absorbed by population growth.

As the gross domestic output has expanded, the share of industry in total output has increased and that of agriculture has declined. Not that agriculture in India could be said to have stagnated during the period -- indeed it was during this period that under the impact of the Green Revolution considerable increases were achieved in the output of major crops like rice as well as wheat -- but the rate of growth of the industrial sector was much higher.

At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that in terms of absorbing labour force, the expansion of employment opportunities in the industrial sector has not been particularly impressive. As a consequence, the availability of land per household dependent on agriculture for livelihood has been on the decline over the years. Not only has the number of rural households depending increasingly on paid employment increased, but also the number of small and marginal farming households. However, while the share of agriculture in G.D.P. has declined from around 60 per cent in early 50's to a little over 40 per cent in early 80's, the proportion of labour force engaged in agriculture has remained, more or less, unchanged at around 75%.

The urban drift in India, which had been quite slow in early part of the 20th century, accelerated thereafter. Thus, while at the turn of the century only 11% of the population was urban based, after 80 years, it had reached 23.7%. We can note the pattern of growth in urbanisation between 1901 and 1981 from Table II. Between 1901 and 1941, the percentage of urban population rose from 11% to 14.1%, i.e., by three percentage points; in the subsequent 40 years, 1941-1981, the urban population rose by almost ten percentage points. In absolute terms, the urban population increased almost four times during the latter period. Between 1961 and 1981, the urban population jumped up from 78 million to 156 million, i.e., exactly doubled.

Although the urban population in India even now is less than one-quarter of the total population, its recent increase has been

sufficiently large and one cannot ignore its possibility increasing impact in the context of the family focus of this paper. The movement of population towards the cities has, as was noted above, lately been speeding up in India. As a result, an increasingly larger number of families in India will be city based. This, it cannot be ruled out that in the foreseeable future of, say, the next twenty years, i.e., till the year 2,000, the proportion of families living in cities will have at least doubled once again.

Whether the pace of urban population growth will be at the annual rate of 3.5% as experienced in the past twenty years, high or lower, is just a matter of conjecture, however formed it is. All the same, it is reasonably safe to say that urban growth in number and character, will depend crucially on not only the growth of industrial output, but also on the growth of employment or income creating opportunities in the urban sector relative to that in the rural sector of the Indian economy. The growth in urban numbers without adequate growth in industrial employment places an undue burden on the urban tertiary sector for the generation of employment opportunities. This is possibly what has been happening in India already as the growth in urban number has accelerated in recent decades, without corresponding increase in the employment opportunities in the industrial sector.

The distribution of income is closely connected with the expansion of employment opportunities. The fact that the distribution of consumer expenditure has been found to remain as grossly uneven as before is an indication of the inadequate expansion of employment opportunities, particularly in the growing sectors of the economy.

But, as we said at the outset, development is much more than the growth and composition of national output. During the past thirty years, life expectancy at birth has registered an improvement in India of over 60% from 32 years to over 50 years. Also, literacy has distinctly improved for women as well as men; the proportion of literates among men has risen from 24.9% in 1951 to 46.6% in 1981, and among women from 7.9% to 24.8% in the same period. Evidently, in spite of the progress achieved in the spread of literacy, women in India are still far behind men and this is something that will have to be borne constantly in mind in the context of the focus of this paper.

II

Major Macro Variables of Change in the Family, India and Kerala

(a) Changes in household size and composition

Contrary to the popular belief with respect to the prevalence of large sized families in India, the average family size has remained remarkably modest, having been close to five in both the rural and urban areas practically all through, since the turn of the century. This can easily be seen from Table III. While during the early part of the century there had been a slight decline in the household size, it has shown a tendency, slight though, to rise since 1921. Not only has the average size of the household remained more or less unchanged but also the position of the middle sized

household of 4 to 6 members relative to the households of other sizes seems to have been practically similar throughout the country. Very large households with a membership of 10 or more has ranged between 5 and 6 per cent among rural as well as urban households throughout the country.

It can be seen also from Table III that the average household size, for Kerala State, has all along been significantly higher than for the country as a whole. Furthermore, the size showed a slow and steady increase till 1971. In 1981, the average size was smaller than in 1971 by five per cent. Significantly, it was during this decade, 1971-1981, that the rate of increase in population for the State declined quite sharply, the rate of increase during 1971-81 being 19% as against 26.19% during 1961-71. Indeed, for the first time in this century has Kerala State recorded growth in population lower than the country and that too by a distinct margin. (19% as against 24.75%).

As regards the composition of households, we gather from the 1951 Population Census that 73% of the average household in India was comprised of its head, his spouse and children (i.e., by members who would constitute a nuclear family except that a very strict definition would exclude even married children), about 26 per cent by other relations and the balance of 1% by related persons. Significantly, there was hardly any difference between the rural and urban sectors for the country as a whole, regarding the weightage of non-nuclear membership of an average household. But the percentage of unrelated persons in urban households was twice as high as in rural households (two per cent as against one per cent in

rural areas). Within some States, however, there were noticeable rural-urban differences in the above regard. In Kerala State, for instance, the rural-urban difference was large. The proportion of non-nuclear members in an average rural household in Kerala was only 22 per cent as against 29 per cent in the average urban household.

According to the Population Census of 1961 also, the percentage of non-nuclear membership of an average Indian household, rural as well as urban, was close to 27, i.e., the same as revealed by the 1951 census. The data collected for 1961 indicate separately the number of married persons staying in a household. On the basis of this information, an attempt was made in a study to construct a quantitative index of joint family on the assumption that "the number of married couples staying together determined the number of them in the aggregate who could be regarded as heads of households". Thus, "larger the number of married couples reporting themselves as heads of households, smaller was the extent of joint family".* According to the above index, (i) the proportion of couples reporting themselves as heads of households was between two-thirds to four-fifths, and (ii) the proportion was generally somewhat larger in the urban areas with the exception of States like Kerala and West Bengal, indicating greater doubling up of couples in rural households. It is also worth noting that Kerala was one of those States where the above index showed a higher overall proportion (around three-fourths) of couples reporting as household heads,

* See Census of India, 1961, Monograph 9, Size and Composition of Households, by Kumudini Dandekar.

even though the average household size in Kerala was somewhat higher than for India and the proportion of non-nuclear membership was quite close to that for the country as a whole.

(b) Changes in type of family

Another widespread impression about the Indian family is that it is generally a joint family. It is interesting that most writers (they were usually British) of census reports in pre-independence India often started analysing the size and composition of the Indian household with the assumption that joint family was universal and were surprised to find in the course of their analysis of the data collected that in reality it was not so. Thus, the notion the joint family being prevalent in India in the past, and its gradual break up in recent years does not find substantial support from the Census data. Here, it is relevant to quote at some length from the report on the Census of 1911:

"In spite of the joint family system, the number of houses corresponds very closely to the number of families in the European sense, i.e., married couples with their children and dependents. The total number of houses is 63.7 million and there are 64.6 million married families aged 15 and over. Except among the higher castes who form but a small fraction of the population, the joint family is not nearly so common as is frequently supposed".*

The Census Report of 1951 noting that (a) the medium sized household with membership of between 4 and 6 was the most numerous, and (b) even in villages every third household was a small household with 3 or less members, observed as follows:

* See Kumudini Dandekar, *op.cit.*

"Such a large proportion of small households is a prima facie indication that families do not continue to be 'joint' according to the traditional custom of the country and the habit of breaking away from the joint family and setting up separate households is quite strong".*

Evidently, jointness of family in the sense of related married couples living and dining together was not in vogue in either 1911 or 1951. Though, as was noted above, there are indications that the size of the average household has increased somewhat in recent decades, it is difficult to draw from that the inference that jointness of the family is on the increase in recent years. The increase in the household size, noted in this paper was possibly because of the operation of other important factors such as urbanisation, increase in the age at marriage, and fall in mortality, just as factors like increased acceptance of family planning might have operated in the opposite direction of reducing the household size.

(c) Increasing age at marriage

In recent years, there has been clear evidence of an increase in the age at marriage of women as well as men (See Table IV).

The population census reports for the period 1881 to 1931, contain interesting accounts of the marriage pattern then obtaining in India. Early and universal marriage was enjoined by the Hindu religion and the practice was followed by other religious groups as well. Around 1929, as many as 93 out of 1,000 girls between the ages of 5 and 10 years, and 399 out of 1,000 girls between the ages of 10 and 15, were married. The situation was particularly unfavourable to women who were exposed not only to the hazards of conception and delivery at a tender age but also to early widowhood. Widow

remarriage was looked down upon among the Hindus. According to the 1921 Census, there were 175 widows in every 1,000 females; of these 148 were below 15.

Over the years, however, through both legislation and increased public awareness, the practice of early marriage has declined considerably though it cannot be said to have altogether disappeared. The age at marriage for girls has started moving up, particularly since 1941.

Legislative action began with the passing of Child Marriage Restraint Act in 1929, fixing the minimum age at marriage for girls at 14. In 1955, this was raised to 16. Only in 1978 was it raised further to 18. However, enforcement of legislation is not very easy, particularly when by either by law or custom there exists virtually no practice for the registration of marriage. A lot of what has actually been achieved in terms of the increase in the average age at marriage must, therefore, have been outcome of factors such as the spread of education, greater social awareness of the ill-effects of early marriage and pressure of economic considerations. The upward movement of the age at marriage is found to be stronger in the urban areas but it has taken place in the rural areas also. Age at marriage is estimated to be about two and a half years higher in urban areas as compared with the rural areas.

Table IV also shows that the age at marriage in Kerala has been distinctly higher than in the country as a whole for both women as well as men. Much more widespread literacy in Kerala compared to the country as a whole may have contributed to the postponement

of marriage as much as the wide prevalence in the State of the system of matrilineal inheritance and matrifocality. In practically the whole of the rest of the country early marriage was considered necessary with a view to finding a marital placement for the girl before she reached the age of puberty. However, in Kerala where the girl's residence or base continued with her mother, the question of sending her away in marriage early did not arise.

Whether the newly formed couples tend to set up house immediately or with a time lag is no doubt important from the point of view of family formation. But given the time lag, postponement in the age at marriage is bound to mean that unmarried children would stay longer with their parents. This would naturally get reflected in the size of the household. The slow but continuing increase in the average size of the Indian household and the postponement in the age at marriage cannot, therefore, be unconnected.

(d) Declining fertility and mortality

Not only had Indian families a large number of children in the past, but they also experienced high rates of mortality. Both birth and death rates in India are still quite high compared to other countries. But, as can be seen from Table V, death rates have been declining in recent decades at a pace faster than birth rates. A major factor contributing to mortality decline has no doubt been the control of epidemics. At the same time it has been possible to reduce significantly the incidence of infant mortality. At the beginning of the 20th century, infant deaths were around 200 per 1,000 live births, an alarmingly high rate by any standard. Over successive decades, there has been a gradual and steady decline

in infant mortality so that by 1970 the rate had declined to 129 per 1,000 live births. This decline of 40% in infant mortality rate, though achieved over a period of 70 years, cannot be considered insubstantial. Still the rate reached in 1970 was quite high when compared to other parts of the world.

Intriguingly, the infant mortality rate for the country as a whole seems to have shown no sign of decline since 1970. The fact, however, that there are marked inter-State differences within India, with Kerala's rate being half that for the country as a whole, indicates the scope for achieving further substantial decreases for the country as a whole, given a push all around towards that objective in the States lagging behind. If, as in the State of Kerala, a further substantial decline in mortality rate is achieved in the other States of India in the near future of say, the next 20 years or so, that should considerably improve the survival rate of children. This in turn, should make for an increase in the size of the family, unless people start accepting a smaller family norm. The latter depends, however, on the extent of acceptance of family planning. The fact that in Kerala State family planning is practised on a significantly larger scale than in the country as a whole cannot be unconnected with the existence of a persistent and substantial infant mortality decline.

(e) Spread of family planning

One of the major changes of recent times has been the increasing availability of the option to control human fertility. Though this opportunity may not be made use of by all families, the very

availability of the choice represents a great change from the olden days. The number of children a family wants to have, the number of boys and girls a family prefers or the boy-girl mix, and the time that a family wants to have before the arrival of the next child or spacing of births can all, to a large extent, be decided upon by the family. These decisions have important implications for the health of the mother and children.

Families in the urban areas have a better chance of controlling the fertility than the rural areas because of better availability. Increasingly, however, the facilities are being extended to rural areas through the network of primary and sub-primary health centres. Each primary health centre, with one or more doctors and some ancillary staff, covers approximately a population of 100,000. In addition, each centre supervises and services eight to ten sub-centres, with an auxiliary nurse-midwife, each covering a population of 10,000. In remote areas of the country, and in some of the backward States, it is difficult to find the personnel to man these centres and sub-centres. Though the facilities available in rural areas have improved considerably in recent years, the acceptance of family planning by the rural couples in the reproductive age groups is still very much less than in urban areas.

On the basis of the data collected by the National Sample Survey, in its 28th round (October 1973 to June 1974) the rate of practice of family planning by couples in the reproductive age of 15-49 years was 10 per cent for the rural areas and 21 per cent for the urban areas. However, the rates varied a great deal between the

States with the highest rate of practice in rural Kerala where the practice of family planning was as high as of one in three.

In general, the practice of family planning was found to be more among those couples who already had a surviving son. The main method of fertility control has been female sterilization. The couples who get sterilized are mostly couples who never practiced family planning before, and opt for the terminal method. The latest position for the country as a whole is that 22% of the couples in the reproductive age-group are now protected from having more children. The corresponding percentage for Kerala is reported to be almost twice as high, being 40.

It is relevant to note that in the availability of medical facilities and their accessibility, Kerala is far ahead of the rest of the country. Thus hospital beds per 100,000 persons in Kerala is 172 as against 85 in the country as a whole. The direct result of this is that with respect to deliveries taking place under proper medical attention the proportion for Kerala is very much higher compared to the country as a whole (See Table VI).

While, as stated earlier, the decline in mortality rates should contribute to increasing the family size the acceptance of family planning should have the opposite effect. Of course, as infant mortality decline increases, the higher survival rate of children as a direct result thereof may build up people's sense of confidence in that regard and lead to the increased acceptance of the small family norm and family planning. Logically, therefore, the decline in infant mortality should indirectly lead to a reduction in family size.

The fact that in Kerala family planning is practised on a significantly larger scale than in the country as a whole cannot be unconnected with the existence of persistent and substantial infant mortality decline. However, since the household size in Kerala is still higher than in the rest of the country, evidently there are other factors in operation which keep the household size from declining even when couples restrict the number of children.

III

Distinctive Features of the Kerala Scene

Though one of the relatively small States in the Indian Union, Kerala has got certain unique demographic and other characteristics of particular interest in the context of this paper. While it has the highest population density, 654 per sq.km. as against 221 for the country as a whole, it also has the highest literacy rate (for women as well as men), the lowest mortality rates, the highest life expectancy and the largest percentage of deliveries under institutional care. In addition, it is among the top few States in regard to the acceptance of family planning, going by the proportion of protected couples out of those within the reproductive age group. The State combines all these features, with apparently relatively low levels of urbanisation and per capita income and high rate of unemployment including educated unemployed.

In order to discuss the kind of impact the development process has had in the family among the disadvantaged groups in Kerala State,

it is necessary, however, to bear particularly in mind the State's special features in regard to its settlement pattern, its family organisation, and its unemployment situation.

(i) The Settlement pattern

The pace of urbanisation has been somewhat slower in Kerala than for the country as a whole. This can be seen from Table II. However, the settlement pattern in Kerala is so very different when compared with the rest of the country that we cannot take the figures of urbanisation at their face value. According to census definition, an area is classified as urban on the basis of three criteria: (i) a minimum population of 5,000, (ii) at least 76% of the male working population being non-agricultural, and (iii) a density of population of at least 400 per sq.km. On the basis of criteria (i) and (ii) most villages in Kerala qualify to be classified as urban areas. Nearly 80% of the rural population of Kerala lives in villages with population of over 10,000 population and another 15% lives in villages with population in the range of 5,000 to 10,000. Thus almost all villages of Kerala would qualify for classification as urban settlements on this score alone. Also, given the high overall density, most villages except those in the high ranges should qualify as urban settlements on the criteria of density. Indeed, it is not easy to demarcate the boundaries of the rural and urban settlements in Kerala since they form an unending continuum right through the State.

More than the concentration of population in rural areas, it is the availability of urban services to rural areas that can be said to make the real difference between Kerala and the rest of the country.

Thus in regard to the length of roads per 100 sq.km. and the ratio of vehicles to population, Kerala is ahead of the other States. Additionally, towns in Kerala operate mostly as service centres making goods and services easily accessible to the surrounding rural areas. As a result, the rural family in Kerala is much more exposed to urban influences than anywhere else in the country. These influences have become even more intense with the recent large scale movement to and from the Middle East. Most rural families are now exposed more than ever before not only to urban type housing amenities but also to modern life styles.

(ii) The matriarchal background

According to the Report on Population Census of 1931, one-third of the families in Kerala followed the matriarchal system completely, and another one-third a mixed system combining patriarchal and matriarchal features. Under the matriarchal system in Kerala the property was jointly owned by the family and was impartible and inalienable except by common consent. Also, both lineage and property was handed through the female members. A common ancestry, through the female line, a common line of authority and undivided inheritance were the main features of the system. Further, it is important to note that marriage did not call for change of residence for girls. In fact, for long, marriage did not enjoy much formal significance.

However, around the turn of the century, under the influence of Western ideas and education, there had sprung up a movement or change towards the general patriarchal system existing in the rest of

the country. A series of legislations was enacted, starting from the year 1896, with a view to formalising marriage and enabling easier partition of joint properties and splitting up of matriarchal families. Thus, 33,000 joint families sought to partition within five years after the enactment of a law on the subject in 1925. While as an ideology governing not only title to property but also interpersonal relations, matriarchy cannot be said to be as dominant today as before, it will be a bold man who will testify to its total extinction in the State.

(iii) The distinctive unemployment situation

Kerala is not as industrialised as some of the other States in India, judging by the contribution of the industrial sector to the State's gross domestic product. Still the State's working force absorbed by its industrial sector is significantly higher compared to the country as a whole, being 18.9 per cent against 11.2%. However, the so-called industrial sector in Kerala is dominated by traditional industries such as cashew, coir and handloom. A large number of these industries use old technologies and are run on a small scale with household as the basis unit of organisation and the families engaged in these get paid even less than those who work for the agriculture sector.

The high population growth rates experienced until recently by the State due largely to rapid reductions in mortality rates, resulted in most households facing the acute problem of unemployment and under-employment. Given very high density, the per capita availability of agricultural land in the State is naturally very low. In addition,

the pattern of land ownership is extremely uneven. Families owning less than half an acre of agricultural land comprise 55 per cent of the rural families, though of these families altogether landless is about 10 per cent. Is it a matter of any surprise if almost all the able bodied adults from these families have had to seek outside employment ?

With practically eight out of every ten adults being able to read and write, employment in Kerala is almost altogether of literate persons. When a distinction is drawn on the basis of the level of education, it appears from the data of the employment exchanges that over half of those registering their names for employment have education beyond the school level. Allowance has to be made, however, for the possibility that persons with higher education, tend to register with employment exchanges in larger numbers than others. All the same, it is still possibly valid that the proportion of better educated among those unemployed is quite considerable.

It is in the above context that the recent exodus of large numbers from the State to the Middle East in search of employment has to be viewed. According to the results of a recent employment survey conducted by the State Bureau of Economics and Statistics, as many as 78,000 persons migrated from the State during a two-year period, 1978 and 1979. (Of these, 75,000, 96% went outside the country). This works out to roughly a quarter of the addition to the State's labour force during those two years. As a proportion of the total number of persons from the State working outside the country, estimated at 0.21 million at the end of 1977, the migration during the

subsequent two years represented 36 per cent. It is believed that migration during the subsequent years, 1980, 1981 and 1982, was also on a scale at least as large as in the preceding two years. Thus, the total number of persons from the State working outside the country should, at the beginning of 1983, be close to 0.35 million. Thus, on an average, one out of every 12 households in the State has one persons working outside the country.

In recent years, migration to Middle East has accounted for the bulk of the outflow of workers from the State. The proportion is believed to be close to 90 per cent. Thus, out of the 75,000 migrants from the State, identified for the years 1978 and 1979, as many as 68,000 are believed to have gone for work to the Middle East. According to the Survey referred to above, almost 70 per cent of those working in the Middle East have education below the high school level. Therefore, migration to the Middle East can be said to have eased the employment situation relatively more for the less educated persons from the State.

IV

Development and Disadvantaged Groups

We shall now try to see how the development process has affected the family structure and family formation variables among the poorer groups in Kerala State. For this purpose, we have, as was indicated at the outset, relied almost altogether on observations based on some recent ethnographic studies of selected households and villages in Kerala State. While the households studied covered a broad spectrum

low income occupations such as agricultural labour, construction work, brick making, coir defibring, fish vending and prawn peeling, the villages studied are those of fishermen. These villages were specially chosen for in-depth observation to study the impact of the development process initiated some thirty years back, soon after India became independent, because of their selection as the site of an externally aided project to modernise fisheries. While the primary thrust of the project was in the improvement on increased productivity in fishing and fish preservation, the project also envisaged improving health services and water supply in and around the three villages. Although these villages formed a compact geographical block, the fishermen of these villages were drawn from two distinct religious groups, namely, Latin Catholic and Araya Hindu. Both the groups rank quite low in their respective social/caste hierarchy. The acceptance of technological change was, however, distinctly different between the two groups. While Latin Catholics largely accepted the new technology, Araya Hindu fishermen almost rejected it.

The questions to which answers have been attempted on the basis of the above-mentioned ethnographic studies are as follows:-

(1) Have any noticeable changes taken place in the quantum and quality of work participation by women? What do changes in work participation by women imply for the family?

(2) What changes have taken place in the family formation variables?

(a) Has marriage become more or less stable?

(b) Is the age at marriage tending to show any sign of getting postponed?

(c) Is the practice of arranged marriages weakening?

(d) How widespread is the practice of dowry?

(3) Are there any indications of change in the ideas about children, i.e., their numbers, sex and spacing of births?

(1) Changes in women's work participation

Most women from low-income families, fishing and non-fishing, were involved in some work or the other in the past. The work activities in which women were engaged were usually low paying, unskilled, menial jobs. The work of women from the fishing families ranged from collecting shells for making lime powder, drying coir, dealing in broken rice to dehusking paddy; women from non-fishing households engaged not only in all sorts of headload carrying in addition to whatever their regular work activity entitled, but also in defibring coir and paddy dehusking. Also, some older women worked as village midwives. While women from the poorer households were prepared to take up work which involved going outside the house, women from somewhat less disadvantages families stayed at home and engaged from there in such activities over and above their day to day household chores as would supplement the family income. Among the fishing families, women going out to work were mostly widows and such other women as were married to coolie fishermen, or fishermen with no boat of their own. In low income households engaged in work other than fishing, women went out to work particularly when their husbands were engaged in casual wage labour. By taking to work, these women are able to minimise the number of days either of the two, husband and wife, was

without work. The idea possibly is that if both husband and wife looked for work at least one of them would get work for the day.

In the families studied, it was observed that women were engaged in paid work even before they got married. They started work as children, supplementing their parents' income and kept working after marriage, with minimum breaks for delivery of children, to supplement the income of their own families.

With the major change that the economic environment of the fishing villages studied has undergone, work opportunities changed and expanded for not only men but also women. Since the Araya Hindu village did not accept mechanization as readily as the two Latin Catholic villages, the participation of men from the former in activities related to mechanized fishing has been much less compared to that of Latin Catholic fishermen. But interestingly, women from the Araya Hindu village have availed themselves considerably of the new work opportunities that have come their way in recent years. The new work opportunities open to Araya Hindu women are principally prawn peeling and net making. Prawn peeling is a paid employment for which most have to go to the neighbouring villages. This work is done on a piece rate basis. Net making, on the other hand, is done at home, though it is different nature than when women in traditional fishing households knitted for their own men. Nylon cord, the raw material, is now supplied by a net dealer; he also collects the knitted material at regular intervals and pays for the work done on piece rate basis. Prawn peeling is twice as well-paying as net making, but it is much more seasonal in that work is concentrated in three to four months in a year.

It is interesting that while work opportunities have increased for the women of the fishing villages studied, it has also meant a major change in the type of work and the income it generates. As between women from the two religious groups, however, work opportunities within easy reach of women from the Latin Catholic villages are both far more remunerative and independent than those open to women from the Araya Hindu village. Since the economic pressure on the younger generation of women from the Latin Catholic villages is less than it was on their mothers and/or mothers-in-law, they do not have to, and most of them don't, take to work while busy bearing and rearing children. But it is not certain that once they are relatively free from the responsibilities of bearing and rearing children, they will be satisfied with doing just the domestic chores, particularly when work opportunity of the type to which they have access is knocking at their doors. It is relevant to bear in mind that these younger women have had better levels of education and better access to medical facilities than their mothers. It is very likely, therefore, that they will take steps not to indulge in excessive child bearing and many of them, though not working now, may decide to take up work once their children are sufficiently grown up. This is particularly likely when the type of work in which most Latin Catholic women are engaged in is such as is satisfying, reasonably remunerative and not objected to by such other members of the family whose opinion in such decisions still counts a lot.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the jobs open to the Araya Hindu women with relatively low wages, little job satisfaction, and virtually no scope for improvement. Is it a matter of surprise

if for women with such jobs, be they from fishing or non-fishing households, even when they have worked all their lives, the ambition is still to withdraw from work? Their work does not seem to confer on these women any better status in either their own self-estimation or social estimation.

Work participation change and the family

The basic economic problem of sheer survival and day to day existence is the most pressing issue the households from low income households face. This problem becomes worse where, for some reason, the menfolk do not contribute anything to the family's maintenance as happens when a husband dies, retires from work, or deserts the wife. In this situation, the economic pressure on women is the maximum because then the entire responsibility of financing as well as running the household falls on the woman. Although given the type of work available to them, women from low income households would rather not go out of the house to work, they still do so under economic pressure.

Regardless of whether the husband is there to contribute to the financing of the household, it has been found that where women do paid work, they invariably contribute a greater proportion of their daily earnings to the family upkeep than their men. Of course, often men earn more than women, even in the same job, however unskilled. Still, cases where men contribute less to the family upkeep when in absolute amount are common.

In Kerala, it is customary for workers to eat out on working days. So often both women and men buy their coffee and lunch when they are working outside the house. But men invariably tend to be

much more lavish in what they spend on eating. Also, often they keep a part of their earning for drinking. Where they are addicted to drinking, they buy drinks on credit on days they are without work. So the family gets invariably a much smaller proportion of a man's earnings. Almost all women from the fishing villages studied complained about the tendency on the part of their men to spend a lot more now on drinking than they did before the days of mechanization. Also, fishermen still engaged in traditional fishing continue to be free with spending on the days of bumper catch. There is little doubt, therefore that for low income households, the greater the availability of work opportunities is for women the higher are the chances that the earnings will go for the family's upkeep.

Of course, the availability of work opportunities to women is extremely important. Over practically the whole of the current century women in India have tended to be thrown out of work as traditional technology has given way to mechanisation. This has happened in industry after industry. That in the fishing villages exposed to mechanisation women have found access to new work opportunities was not something that even the project design itself envisaged. It can even be argued that the new jobs for women have been a consequence less of mechanisation than of the discovery of new prawn fields. The fact remains that job opportunities have not normally expanded for women in the wake of mechanization.

In the households studied, women have certainly shown a greater readiness to seize opportunities for economic betterment than their men. The Araya Hindu fishermen, more or less rejected the new

technology of fishing, but their womenfolk have still not spurned the new work opportunities thrown up in the wake of mechanization. Thus, women are not averse to taking up work opportunities should they arise.

Assuming that hereafter work opportunities will expand, how will it affect the family? If one goes by what has been observed in the low income households studied, the more women take to work, the better it is for family upkeep. But will a working woman be equally willing to support her husband's relatives as her own children and relatives? As more and more women take to earning a living, will it not lead to splitting of families earlier than at present? In the fishing households studied, tensions have no doubt been noticed, but it is difficult to say that increased work participation by women caused these tensions. In the non-fishing households studied where women were working families tended to be nuclear in the sense that married sons and daughters tended to set up separate households as soon as possible after marriage.

(ii) Changes in family formation variables

(a) Stability of marriages

The ideas on universality of marriage seem to continue irrespective of caste and religion. Among the households studied, marriage was, and is, universal. While among the Latin Catholics there is scope to lead a celibate life as a nun or a priest, not even one instance was cited of someone having opted for celibacy among the families studied. If some men and women from the fishing households do get enrolled as priests and nuns, their proportion would be quite small. The Hindus, on the other hand, have strongly believed that marriage

was universally necessary and that life was incomplete without it. Still among Kerala's Brahmin caste of Namboodiris, several women remained unmarried for life because only the eldest son was allowed to marry within caste; other sons were supposed to have alliances with girls of the lower caste. Then there is also the general Hindu antipathy to widow remarriage. On the whole, however, universality of marriage could still be said to have been the order of the day.

The belief in the universality of marriage, however, has not precluded men and women, particularly among the low income Hindu groups from entering into alliances other than those solemnised in temples by caste associations. With the menace of dowry recently entering even such groups, common law type of alliances are beginning to take place even among relatively younger persons. Earlier, such alliances were entered into when the first or subsequent formal marriage broke on death, or separation. Cases where even in formal marriage husbands have walked out on their women, particularly after the wife had had two or three children, are not uncommon. Once deserted, women themselves enter subsequently into common-law type of alliance, possibly not to be lulled again into a false sense of security. But then the commitment of men to families they thus enter into tends to be even more fragile than it is in properly solemnised marriages. Desertions have been found to occur oftener so that women get saddled more frequently with the responsibility of running the family entirely on their own. Thus, while among the low castes, as for example the low Hindus, stability of marriage is becoming less and less certain.

(b) Postponement of marriage

As was noted earlier, the age at marriage in Kerala has been somewhat higher than in the country as a whole for quite some years now. Pre-puberty marriage that was widely prevalent in the rest of the country till the late thirties was not an issue here at all. Between the two groups of fishing households studied the age at marriage has, however, shown signs of rising more among the Hindus than among Catholics.

Going by the Parish records, the age at which Catholic girls and boys are married has risen by only one year in the past 80 years. The average age at marriage for girls has risen during this period from 16 to 17; the age differential between the bride and groom has remained at around five to six years. The Araya Hindu families get their girls married later at around 20 years; forty years back their age at marriage was 18. Among other low income households studied, the age at marriage of girls has tended in recent years to be 20 and above.

One possible reason for delayed marriages among the Araya Hindu girls in recent years could be that these girls tend to work even when unmarried whereas this is much less common among the Latin Catholics. However, among the latter the practice of dowry is much more strongly entrenched than others and this factor should have tended to operate as a brake on early marriage. Parents have to put together the necessary resources before they can marry off their daughters. Still, it is among them that the girls have tended to be married off early.

(c) Continuing practice of arranged marriages

Parents continue to arrange the marriage of their children however modest a family's economic and social background. This is so regardless of religion. The major portion of the responsibility for finding the right boy for a girl and vice versa still falls on close relatives and friends. The main considerations that go into the choice of a boy are religion, caste, possible dowry, economic position of the family, and the education and employment prospects of the boy himself. In the fishing villages studied, while the Latin Catholic families prefer to get their sons and daughters married in the same village, the Araya Hindu families seem to depend on the wider network spreading over the neighbourhood villages. In other low income occupational groups studied also, arranged marriages are still the rule. However, as the practice of common law type of alliances is spreading, the parents' role in the choice of partner for a boy or girls is naturally diminishing.

(d) Spread of dowry

Though the payment of dowry was not altogether unknown among low income groups, where the practice existed, as for example, among the Latin Catholic fishermen, dowry paid on a girl's marriage was in very modest proportion. Among the Araya Hindus studied, there was, it appears no practice of dowry; nor of bride price. None of the case histories of Araya Hindu fishermen studied mention exchange of dowry or bride price at the turn of the century. But the situation seems to have been changing between successive generations. In recent years



particularly since the late sixties, dowry has started spreading among the Araya Hindus. However, it is among the Latin Catholic fishing households that the dowry which has existed always, has escalated considerably. The sums involved in Araya Hindu marriages are still much more modest. Among other low-income households also the practice of giving dowry seems to have taken roots.

How does one explain this trend? It is true that unlike the country as a whole, Kerala State's sex ratio is in favour of women. But among the fishing households in Kerala State men have outnumbered women. The same situation was found to obtain in the villages studied. So neither the emergence of dowry among one group nor the increase of dowry in the other can be explained by the fact that there are more girls available and hence a premium has to be paid for boys. It also cannot easily be explained by the fact that boys are more qualified and better equipped to face life than before. No doubt, earnings from fishing have increased phenomenally in the wake of mechanisation and discovery of prawn fields in the vicinity of the villages studied but the beneficiaries have come largely from Latin Catholic, not Araya Hindu, families. Among the Araya Hindus, only women have had access to more work opportunities. With most Araya Hindu young men still engaged in traditional fishing, one could, in strict logic therefore, have looked for the emergence of bride price among this group. Actually, however, it is dowry which has become the order of the day among them even though it is still quite modest compared to the level currently prevailing among the neighbouring Latin Catholics. On the other hand, income as well as wealth differentials seems to have widened not only between Latin Catholics and Araya Hindus but within them as some families

have done much better than others. Of course, given the opportunity the differentials have widened much more within the Latin Catholic fishermen of the villages studied, could it not be that with competition from every family to marry its daughters into the family that has done well, the dowry has tended to shoot up?

Whatever the explanations, looking at dowry from the point of view of the family as an institution, it has to be noted that parents of girls have to put together sums which are quite often way beyond their capacity. Of course, since most families have a combination of girls and boys, the parents try to use money brought in by sons to top off the dowry for the girls. But this itself has been a point, however, of great conflict and misunderstanding within each family. Strictly speaking, the dowry a girl brings in belongs to her. It is duly recorded among both the Latin Catholic and Araya Hindus. So when a girl's dowry is used by her in-laws for the marriage of her husband's sister, it is resented though often the girl and her parents accept it as inevitable. However, it remains as a point of conflict not only between families but also within a family, and hastens the splitting up of family. The sooner a girl can persuade her husband to set up a separate household the better are the chances that her dowry will not be used up by the husband's family. Of course, the chances of the husband using, or misusing, her dowry always remain

However, there is a positive aspect even to the practice of dowry. Dowry brings the family together, in the sense that the father and/or brothers have to work together to mobilise the resources to put together the dowry. To that extent, strengthening the family cohesiveness may well be the consequence. Also, neighbours and

of the girl's family contribute a little in this effort. All contributions thus received are duly recorded as that when a girl is due to be married in a friend or neighbour's family, the contributions received are duly reciprocated. Thus, the practice of dowry can be said to contribute somewhat to intra and inter family cohesiveness. However, taking the negative and positive effects of dowry together, it is doubtful if its net impact is at all positive. As has been noted earlier in this paper, girls from low income households are being increasingly driven by the menace of dowry into non-formal alliances which are far less stable than formal marriages. Also, misunderstandings between and within families arise where owing to the lack of immediate access to resources, marriages often take place on part payment of the dowry. Any default or delay leads to conflicts which sometimes lead to a woman, even when she has given birth to a child or two, being driven out of the house by the husband and his family. In other parts of India, women are known to have often been driven to suicide on this score. In the households studied, only one case was reported of suspected suicide by a young girl within a year of her marriage. The neighbours of this particularly family felt that the suicide had something to do with dissatisfaction in the husband's house in regard to dowry actually received.

(e) Changing view on sex and number of children

Just like the ideas on the universality of marriage, the ideas on the importance of children in the family continue their sway. A new bride is expected to bring forth a child in the shortest possible time after marriage. Her most important function and contribution

continue to be to produce children, preferably sons. Also, the belief that fertility is a divine blessing and childlessness a curse, persists. So a new bride by conceiving quickly proves that she does not carry any curse. By producing a son she not only becomes acceptable, but establishes her legal claim on the family property in patriarchal groups. Even in groups with traditions of matriarchy sons were considered desirable for certain ritual and other functions, though for property descent it was necessary to have girls. In recent years, however, with attempt at adopting patriarchy among these groups the premium on sons has increased enormously. Sons are also considered necessary as an insurance against old age and illness.

According to the studies of low income households referred to in the paper, these ideas have continued to persist among the Christians and Hindus of even low incomes. So, having children, preferably sons, is of first and foremost concern to every woman the moment she gets married regardless of the circumstances, economic or otherwise, of the family. Thus, there is virtually no change in the idea of having children in the family.

Given, however, the overall commitment to having children, change is noticeable with respect to the number of children couples are content to have. This seems to be the direct result of the considerable improvement achieved in Kerala, among practically all income groups, in the prospects of survival of children. It was clearly reflected in the readiness of younger couples in the families studied to take to family planning after they have had two to three children. The readiness, it was observed, is greater where the couples have

already had at least one son. The major method of fertility control resorted to by couples has so far been female sterilization. This is particularly true of low income groups. Although in the decision to go in for sterilisation, not only the husband and wife but also the parents seem to be involved, the ultimate decision rests quite a lot with the woman herself.

Since sons, not daughters, are supposed to take care of the parents in their old age, on this score alone, sons are considered more essential to have than daughters. With the spread of dowry, daughters have increasingly come to be regarded as liabilities even where patriarchy had been quite a dominant ideology until the early part of the present century.

With the expectation of life of both men and women going up, the age composition of families is bound to undergo a change. More and more families will need to take care of parents and for longer periods. With virtually no system of social security in the country, the care of old people is probably going to become a major problem families are going to face in the future. If sons alone can be relied upon for the purpose, the preference for sons is bound to get reinforced. And, this may be so even more in low income groups because in high income groups, old people can still hope to depend on their property to pull them through, at least economically.

Thus, what seems to be happening is that while families are continuing to have strong son preference, they try to accommodate it within a smaller number of children. This, therefore, is bound to have its impact on the size of the family. On the other hand,

as with the increased life expectancy older persons live longer the family size should tend to become larger, given the obligation of children, particularly sons, to maintain parents. The net effect probably will still be to reduce the household size unless some other factors operate to raise the size.

In this context, it is relevant to refer to the impact of the recent migration of workers from Kerala State in fairly large numbers to the Middle East in search of employment opportunities. Since jobs there are very much better paying than what is available locally, the former carry high premium which gets mopped up by various types of intermediaries. Also, a certain amount of initial investment has to be made by an emigrant worker on his travel and clothing. To enable him to meet these expenses, the family support is most crucial. Also, when a married worker goes abroad, he entrusts his wife and children to the care of his/her parents, or, in their absence, other relatives. Subsequently, when he starts remitting funds from abroad, he has to rely on his relatives to manage these funds. This includes financing the day to day expenses of his wife and children, clearing the debts incurred by him before migrating and investing in land and buildings. On his part, the migrant worker has to look out for opportunities abroad for his relatives. So, the family interdependence can certainly be said to have increased as a result of the recent migration from Kerala to the Gulf. In a few households, in the fishing villages studied, which reported migration, jointness of dining and living seems to have increased. Married daughters with children have doubled up with mothers or other married sisters. But one cannot generalise in this regard on the basis of the small number of families studied. On the

whole, however, it would still appear that just as when people replaced the traditional mechanised boats or when people build new houses involving sizeable investments and relied on help from relatives, friends and neighbours, migration to the Middle East has also promoted this type of interdependence further.

Concluding observations and Policy Implications

Broadly, the impacts of development in India on the family, particularly among the low income groups can be said to be both positive as well as negative. Appropriate policy implications can be drawn on the basis of the judgement formed on what aspects of the family need to be promoted.

On the positive side, it can safely be said on the basis of the experience so far in India that the basic concepts and ideas on the family togetherness and obligations seem to be still quite strongly rooted. The process of development does not seem to have affected the family on the whole adversely though important changes have been taking place in several family formation variables. Thus, the age at marriage has uniformly gone up so that new families are formed increasingly at a more respectable age. Also, though there are significant differences between the various States of India, couples are able to and increasingly decide and opt for fewer children. However, fewer families experience less and less the traumatic experience of early loss of either children or parents. Furthermore, women have increasing access to trained medical care at the time of delivery. Additionally, general awareness has increased because of the improved

access to education for women as well as men. Wherever opportunities arise women participate more and more in paid work thereby reversing the process of de-employment that had been going on in the wake of the earlier type of industrialisation. The present spurt in the migration of workers outside the country seems also to have reinforced inter-dependence within the family. Thus intra-family interdependence can be said to be on the increase while the net impact of the various factors on the family size may be somewhat downwards.

Note will also have to be taken that with necessary pressure on land over the years, not only has landlessness in the rural areas been on the increase but also there are clear indications of an accelerated exodus to the cities where again there is taking place increasing marginalisation because of slow expansion in industrial employment. How is the family as an institution going to be affected in this process? Negatively or positively? Women and children left behind by urban migrants will have to be taken care of by relatives. Urban migrants themselves might seek where possible, shelter and support from relatives already settled in towns. So interdependence is bound to increase. But with the family as an institution, increasingly bereft of its assistance, be able to sustain the burden such interdependence imposes? Or will it lead to increasing breakdown of the institutions itself?

On the clearly negative side, with increasing life expectancy the likelihood is that older numbers will live longer. Also, both the parents are likely to be alive together for longer stretches. While this may be considered a positive development for the old cou-

this may well lead to increasing tensions within the family. Also, the children might feel less committed to the maintenance of both the parents than to a single parent. To the extent that this turns out to be correct, the danger of increasing destitution with age may have to be provided against by suitable State policy.

Probably the more immediately serious problem is posed by the spread of dowry in the country. Today even very low income groups seem to have adopted the dowry system. With the pressure to which dowry subjects the parents of girls to, it is bound to lead to further discrimination in food and health care of girls. Already, the sex ratio in India is unfavourable to women. The spread of dowry, it is feared, might aggravate those practices which are responsible for the present sex ratio. Appropriate state action will have to concern itself with not just dowry deaths which seem to be on the increase. That would amount to dealing with symptoms rather than the problem itself. Increasing both the quantum as well as the quality of work opportunities for women might well be a much more fruitful direction to pursue to meet the problem.

From the point of view of the family as an institution the danger posed by the dowry system is the weakening of the ideas on formal marriages among low income families. Unfortunately, non-formal alliances tend to be far less stable and as a result family cohesiveness may suffer.

The prospects for the future for the Indian family, rural or urban, are not clearly indicated. But appropriate policy action at various levels might help sustain the family as an institution weather the storms ahead much more confidently than if things are left to themselves.

TABLE - I

SELECTED INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA

I. Population: (1) Total	(a) 1951	Million	361
	(b) 1981	"	684
(2) Growth rate	(a) 1951	%	1.3
	(b) 1981	%	2.2
II. Urban Population Growth Rate	(a) 1951	%	3.5
	(b) 1981	%	3.9
III. Income per capita (1970-71 prices)	(a) 1950-51	Rs.	466
	(b) 1980-81	Rs.	790
IV. Annual Rate of Growth: 1950-51 to 1978-79	(a) Gross Domestic Product	%	3.5
	(b) Agricultural production	%	2.7
	(c) Industrial production	%	6.1
V. Share of Agriculture and Allied Sectors in G.D.P.	(a) 1950-51	%	58.2
	(b) 1980-81	%	42.5
VI. Proportion of Labour Force engaged in Agriculture and Allied Sectors:	(a) 1941	%	74.4
	(b) 1951	%	72.4
	(c) 1971	%	73.4
VII. Distribution of household expenditure --- Share of bottom 30% of population:	(a) Rural (i) 1958-59	%	15.1
	(ii) 1977-78	%	15.5
	(b) Urban (i) 1958-59	%	13.1
	(ii) 1977-78	%	13.1
VIII. Percentage of people below the poverty line:	(a) Rural (i) 1972-73	%	54.1
	(ii) 1977-78	%	50.0
	(b) Rural (i) 1971-73	%	41.1
	(ii) 1977-78	%	30.1
IX. Life Expectancy at Birth:	(a) Men (i) 1941	Years	32.1
	(ii) 1981	"	52.1
	(b) Women (i) 1941	"	31.1
	(ii) 1981	"	51.1
X. Literacy as percentage of total population:	(a) Men (i) 1951	%	24
	(ii) 1981	%	46
	(b) Women (i) 1951	%	7
	(ii) 1981	%	24

Source: (1) Sixth Five Year Plan, 1980-85.
(2) Census of India.

TABLE - II

GROWTH OF URBAN POPULATION IN INDIA AND KERALA,
1901-1981

Census Year	I n d i a		K e r a l a	
	Level of urban po- pulation	Total urban population	Level of urban po- pulation	Total urban po- pulation
1	2	3	4	5
	%	million	%	million
1901	11.0	25.6	7.6	4.5
1911	10.4	25.6	7.3	5.2
1921	11.3	27.7	8.7	6.8
1931	12.2	33.0	9.6	9.1
1941	14.1	43.6	10.8	11.9
1951	17.6	61.6	13.4	18.2
1961	18.3	77.6	15.1	25.5
1971	20.2	107.0	16.2	34.6
1981	23.7	156.2	18.7	47.7

- Sources: - (1) Census of India, 1981, Provisional Population Total, Series 2, Paper 2 of 1981.
(2) Census of India, 1971, Kerala, Series 9, Part I, A & B Series 2.

TABLE - III (a)
CHANGES IN AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE,
1901 - 1971, INDIA

Year	All households
1901	5.2
1911	4.9
1921	4.9
1931	5.0
1941	5.1
1951	4.9
1961	5.2
1971	5.2

Sources:- Census of India, 1961, V.I. Monograph No.9,
Size and Composition of Households, Kumudini
Dandekar.

TABLE - III (b)
CHANGES IN AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD SIZE, 1951 - 1981,
INDIA AND KERALA, RURAL AND URBAN AREAS

Year	<u>I n d i a</u>		<u>K e r a l a</u>	
	Rural house- holds	Urban house- holds	Rural house- holds	Urban house- holds
1951	4.97	5.01	5.61	5.93
1961	5.23	5.07	5.07	6.22
1971	5.46	5.52	6.03	5.96
1981	N.A.	N.A.	5.70	6.02

Source:- Census of India, 1981, Series 9 & 10, Kerala,
Final Population Totals and General Report.

TABLE - IV

MEAN AGE AT MARRIAGE FOR MALES AND FEMALES,
1901 to 1971

Year	I n d i a		K e r a l a	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
1901	20.2	13.2	23.3	17.1
1911	20.5	13.6	23.8	17.3
1921	18.4	12.6	23.3	17.8
1931	20.2	15.0	25.6	19.6
1941	19.8	15.4	25.6	19.3
1951	21.4	16.1	26.3	19.8
1961*	21.3	16.7	23.8	20.0
1971	22.7	17.2	26.3	20.8

Source: - "Fact Book on Population and Family Planning",
Demographic Research Centre, Trivandrum, 1974.

TABLE - V

BIRTH, DEATH AND INFANT MORTALITY RATES,
INDIA AND KERALA, 1901 - 81

Decade/ Year	Birth rate		Death rate		Infant mortality rate	
	India	Kerala	India	Kerala	India	Kerala
1901-1910	49.2	..	42.6
1911-1920	48.1	..	47.2	38.7	278	242
1921-1930	46.4	..	36.3	33.8	228	210
1931-1940	45.2	40.0	31.2	29.1	207	173
1941-1950	39.9	39.8	27.4	22.3	192	153
1951-1960	41.7	38.9	22.8	16.9	140	120
1961-1970	38.8	31.9	17.3	9.2	114	66
1971-1980						
1981	33.3	25.5	14.2	6.4	..	39

- Sources:- (1) Fact Book on Population and Family Planning, Demographic Research Centre, Trivandrum, 1974.
(2) Economic Review, 1982, State Planning Board, Trivandrum.

TABLE - VIRURAL AND URBAN BIRTHS BY TYPE OF MEDICAL ATTENTION
AT BIRTH, INDIA, 1971, 1976, 1978

Type of Medical attention	1971		1976		1978	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Medical Institution	7.8	32.2	10.7	38.7	15.6	46.9
Trained Medical Practitioners	11.3	25.5	12.1	24.8	8.1	15.2
Untrained Practitioners	53.1	30.9	53.6	25.5	58.8	25.0
Others	27.8	12.4	23.4	10.9	17.5	12.9

Source: - Office of the Registrar-General, "Survey of Infant and Child Mortality, 1979, A Preliminary Report", (New Delhi, 1980), p.28.

TABLE - VIIMEDICAL ATTENDANCE AT BIRTH, KERALA, (RURAL)
1972 - 1977 (PERCENTAGE)

Type of Medical attention	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Medical Institution	25.1	26.0	28.1	28.8	32.1	35.6
Trained Medical Practitioners	19.3	20.4	20.8	21.8	19.8	17.6
Untrained Practitioners	38.9	36.2	37.5	34.8	32.6	31.8
Others	16.7	17.4	13.6	14.6	15.5	15.0

Source: - Sample Registration Kerala - Rural Annual Report 1977 No.15