dc.contributor.author |
Ghosh, Sunandan |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2019-05-25T08:08:21Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2019-05-25T08:08:21Z |
|
dc.date.copyright |
2014 |
en_US |
dc.date.issued |
2014-12 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/64 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
This paper deals with the issue of delegation between potential
member countries while forming a Customs Union (CU) under a vertically
differentiated monopoly in a three country world. Under universal market
coverage, CU formation can be sustained with both the member countries
preferring CU over setting tariff unilaterally and non-cooperatively but
differing in the choice of the member being delegated the tariff-setting
power. However, if the country with smaller relative taste diversity is
smaller in size, then CU formation can’t be sustained as a unique NE
since both will prefer to set tariffs unilaterally and non-cooperatively
over delegating the tariff-setting power and form a CU. |
en_US |
dc.format.extent |
36 |
en_US |
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
en_US |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
en_US |
dc.publisher |
Centre for Development Studies |
en_US |
dc.source |
Centre for Development Studies |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Customs Union, Delegation, Vertically Differentiated Monopoly, Endogenous Quality, Taste Diversity. |
en_US |
dc.title |
Delegation in Customs Union Formation |
en_US |
dc.type |
text |
en_US |
dc.publisher.date |
2014-12 |
|
dc.publisher.place |
Trivandrum |
en_US |
lrmi.learningResourceType |
book |
en_US |