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Delegation in Customs Union Formation

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dc.contributor.author Ghosh, Sunandan
dc.date.accessioned 2019-05-25T08:08:21Z
dc.date.available 2019-05-25T08:08:21Z
dc.date.copyright 2014 en_US
dc.date.issued 2014-12
dc.identifier.uri http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/64
dc.description.abstract This paper deals with the issue of delegation between potential member countries while forming a Customs Union (CU) under a vertically differentiated monopoly in a three country world. Under universal market coverage, CU formation can be sustained with both the member countries preferring CU over setting tariff unilaterally and non-cooperatively but differing in the choice of the member being delegated the tariff-setting power. However, if the country with smaller relative taste diversity is smaller in size, then CU formation can’t be sustained as a unique NE since both will prefer to set tariffs unilaterally and non-cooperatively over delegating the tariff-setting power and form a CU. en_US
dc.format.extent 36 en_US
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher Centre for Development Studies en_US
dc.source Centre for Development Studies en_US
dc.subject Customs Union, Delegation, Vertically Differentiated Monopoly, Endogenous Quality, Taste Diversity. en_US
dc.title Delegation in Customs Union Formation en_US
dc.type text en_US
dc.publisher.date 2014-12
dc.publisher.place Trivandrum en_US
lrmi.learningResourceType book en_US


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